The appointment of Justice Bhushan Ramakrishna Gavai as the Chief Justice of India (CJI) — with a tenure lasting from May 14 to November 23, 2025 — has reignited discussions about the structure and effectiveness of judicial leadership in the country. His predecessor, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, held office for an even shorter period, serving from November 11, 2024, to May 13, 2025.
This pattern of short tenures is not an isolated occurrence. Justice BV Nagarathna is projected to have a mere 36-day term as CJI later this decade, and Justice UU Lalit served for just 74 days. Such abbreviated terms provide little opportunity for Chief Justices to introduce substantial reforms or influence long-term judicial policy.
In contrast, Justice DY Chandrachud’s two-year tenure from November 2022 to November 2024 illustrates the potential impact of extended leadership. During his time in office, the judiciary witnessed significant advancements in digital integration and heard landmark constitutional cases. His tenure underscores the argument that longer periods in office enable CJIs to leave a meaningful legacy.
Notably, the framers of the Indian Constitution, including Dr B.R. Ambedkar, deliberated deeply on judicial independence but did not consider fixed tenures for the Chief Justice. Instead, they focused on ensuring impartiality, a clear retirement age, and protection against executive interference. The seniority convention — where the most senior judge ascends to the position of CJI — emerged organically, not by constitutional design, and has led to inconsistent tenure lengths.
At the time of drafting the Constitution, short tenures were not seen as a concern, given that the early CJIs served relatively longer terms. However, today’s frequent turnover has highlighted a gap in structural foresight. As the judicial system has expanded in scale and complexity, the limitations of brief leadership stints have become increasingly evident.
Legal scholars and practitioners now argue that fixed tenures — potentially spanning three to five years — would enhance judicial continuity and accountability. A longer term would allow Chief Justices to set strategic goals, lead systemic reforms, and introduce improvements in case management, judicial training, and technological integration.
Internationally, several democracies have addressed this issue through tenure security. The Chief Justice of the United States, for instance, holds the position for life, ensuring long-term policy influence and institutional stability. While India may not adopt such a model, establishing a fixed tenure would bring the country closer to global best practices in judicial governance.
Ultimately, the question is whether India’s Parliament and legal community are prepared to reconsider a decades-old convention that may no longer serve the demands of a modern democracy. A fixed tenure for the Chief Justice of India could lead to a more stable, visionary, and accountable judiciary — one better equipped to uphold the rule of law and public trust.
As India navigates its journey toward judicial efficiency and institutional strength, reforming the tenure structure of its top judicial office is a debate that can no longer be postponed.
